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Bio-Fuel Market: Hypothetical Scenarios
a b s t r a c t
This paper employs the Ivaldi-Vibes algorithm to model the U.S. fuel 
market under the hypothetical scenario in which the ethanol production 
subsidies were phased out from 1995- 2005. Under this hypothetical 
situation, the individuals were not only willing to switch their con-
sumption decision, but they were also willing to consider alternative 
modes of transportation including public transportation, biking or 
walking. As a result, the outside alternative market share increased 
about 4% and 6% and the conventional fuel market shares increased 
while the ethanol blends experienced decreases across all petroleum 
districts. This methodology also permitted simulating the impact of this 
elimination on the fuel prices. The conventional fuel prices increased 
in a range between 0.12 and 1.34 percent. Finally, since different types 
of oxygenates are blended with the regular fuel to compliance the EPA 
regulations, the reduction in the reformulated gasoline market shares 
implied a trade off in the demand for these oxygenates whose variation 
rates averaged 55.14% for the ethanol-MTBE ratio.
pa l a B r a S  c l av e : Biofuels, ethanol, production subsidies, oxyge-
nates, marginal costs.
c l a S i F i c a c i ó n  Jel: Q16, H23,H25,Q52.
r e s umen
En este trabajo se emplea el algoritmo de Ivaldi-Vibes para modelar 
el mercado de combustibles de EE.UU. bajo el escenario hipotético 
en el que los subsidios a la producción de etanol fueron eliminados 
desde 1995 hasta 2005. En esta situación hipotética, los individuos 
no sólo estaban dispuestos a cambiar su decisión de consumo, sino 
también a considerar modos alternativos de transporte, incluyendo el 
transporte público, en bicicleta o caminar. Como resultado, la cuota 
de mercado exterior alternativa aumentó un 4% y 6% y las cuotas del 
mercado de combustibles convencionales aumentó, mientras que el 
etanol combinado experimentó disminuciones en todos los distritos 
petroleros. Esta metodología también permite simular el impacto 
de esta eliminación en los precios de los combustibles. Los precios 
de los combustibles convencionales aumentaron en un rango entre 
0,12 y 1,34 por ciento. Por último, ya que los diferentes tipos de 
compuestos oxigenados son combinados con la gasolina regular para 
el cumplimiento de las regulaciones de la EPA, la reducción de las 
cuotas de mercado de combustibles reformulados implica un trade-off 
de la demanda de estos productos oxigenados, cuya tasa de variación 
promedio es de 55,14% para la razón etanol- MTBE.
k e y wo r d S : Biocombustibles, etanol, subsidios a la producción, 
oxigenados, costos marginales.
Jel  codes: Q16, H23,H25,Q52.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Interest in issues related to the environment and energy se-
curity at world-wide level has increased over the past decade. 
Those factors along with the incentives to use agricultural 
commodities to produce industrial products and increases in 
the petroleum prices have motivated the development of al-
ternative fuels such as ethanol, biodiesel and natural gas.
In the United States, specifically, there are two major re-
newable fuels that are being produced: ethanol produced 
from grain, and biodiesel produced from vegetable oils and 
animal fats. Indeed, the demand for ethanol and biodiesel is 
mostly mandated by federal and state legislations.
According to the study done by Koplow (2006), subsidies 
in the ethanol industry have a long tradition which started 
with the Energy Tax Act of 1978 that introduced the first fede-
ral subsidization of ethanol production. That Act established a 
full exemption of 0.04US$/gallon motor fuel excise tax1 for 
ethanol-gasoline blends. The Energy Security Act of 1980 and 
the Crude Oil Wind- fall Profits Tax Act of 1980 provided fe-
derally-insured loans for ethanol producers and extended the 
ethanol-gasoline tax exemption through the end of 1992. It is 
worth noting that the former Act allowed guarantees of up to 
90% of the construction cost for production capacities of less 
than one million gallons a year2. In 1980 a tariff of 0.50 US$/
gallon was also introduced in order to protect the domestic 
production of ethanol. This tariff was increased 0.60 US$/ga-
llon with the implementation of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984. Furthermore, these incentives were not only directed 
1 Equivalently, this excise tax represented 0.40 US$/gallon of pure ethanol.
2 This loans had a limit over 1 million dollars.
[4]
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to the producer’s side, but also a federal legislation encoura-
ged consumption side through the Alternative Motor Fuels 
Act of 1988 which provided credits to automakers that satis-
fied their Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards for car 
fueled by alternatives fuels.
The Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, and the Energy Conservation Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1998 allowed the growth of the renewable fuel in-
dustry during the 1990s. Recently, the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002, American Jobs Creation Act 2004 and 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 have strengthened the develop-
ment of these biofuels. The following table presents a brief sum-
mary of the federal policies of the blenders’ credits that have 
contributed to the development of the biofuel industry:
Table 1
Federal policy of blenders credits
Period Authority Value on a pure ethanol basis
1978
Energy Tax Act of 1978
Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 1980
0.40$/gal
0.40$/gal
0.40$/gal blenders credit*
1983 Surface Transportation Assistance Act
0.50$/gal
0.09$/gal for ≥ E85
1984 Tax Reform Act 1984
0.60$/gal
0.60$/gal blenders credit*
1986 Tax Reform Act 1986 0.06$/gal for ≥ E85
1990
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990
0.54$/gal
0.54$/gal blenders credit*
1992 Energy Policy Act of 1992
0.54$/gal net @.0416$/gal of 7,7% blend
0.0308$/gal of 5.7% blend
2001-2002 Transportation Equity Act 0.53$/gal
2003-2004 0.52$/gal
2005-2007 0.51$/gal
2005 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 0.51$/gal
Source: EIA Ethanol Timeline; RFA, October 24, 2004; Duffield and Collins (2006) 
Gielecki et.al. (2001); GAO/GGD-91-41; Hartley (2006).
*Blenders income tax credit is reduced by any benefit from the excise tax reduction; 
they are not additive.
Reproduction: Koplow Doug (2006). “Biofuel-at What Cost? Government Support for 
Ethanol and Biodiesel in the United States”. Gevena, Switzerland: Global Subsidies Ini-
tiative of International Institute for Sustainable Development.
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It is worth mentioning that the current tariff is about 0.54 
US$/gallon and that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 establis-
hed a minimum consumption level for biofuels called the Re-
newable Fuel Standards (RFS). RFS mandates the purchase of 
four billion gallons of renewable fuels in 2006, increasing to 
7.5 billion in 2012 with increases equivalent to the increase 
in gasoline after that.
The Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990 establis-
hed two major oxygenate requirements in order to address 
two specific air-pollution problems. An oxygenate was requi-
red to be blended to reformulated gasoline and oxygenated 
fuels. In the past, the methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was 
the main oxygenate utilized by refineries. Ethanol and MTBE 
were considered substitutes for this end use, but MTBE is cu-
rrently being phased out in most of the states due to potential 
groundwater contamination. The MTBE bans have certainly 
affected the demand for ethanol guaranteeing it a market sha-
re as the most important oxygenate.
The oxygen content requirement included in the federal 
and state policies and regulations has opened a market for 
ethanol fuel3. As I previously mentioned, there are, in fact, 
some blended products derived such as the reformulated ga-
soline4 (RFG), E10 (fuel composed of 10% of ethanol, 90% of 
gasoline) and E85 (fuel composed of 85% of ethanol, 15% of 
3  The demand for ethanol is determined by its two end uses which are as 
conventional gasoline volume extender and as oxygenate.
4 Reformulated gasoline must contain a minimum of 2.0% of oxygen. 
Because of the ban on the use of MTBE, Ethanol might become the most 
common source to satisfy the oxygenate requirement imposed on the gasoli-
ne production. Notice that 10% ethanol blends contain about 3.5% oxygen 
in the fuel. Therefore, the oxygen content requirement can be accomplished 
using a 7.7% blend of ethanol with conventional gasoline.
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gasoline). The last two products could be grouped into the 
category of oxygenated gasoline because of their minimum 
oxygen requirement which is at least 2.7%. However, there 
exists skepticism to consider ethanol and the derived pro-
ducts as possible substitutes for the conventional gasoline due 
to the fact that ethanol competitiveness is mostly based on the 
subsidies established to promote the development of clean 
fuel alternatives. Moreover, there are technical concerns such 
as its low energy content and the logistics involved in the dis-
tribution of these biofuels.
It should be noted that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is amending the RFG regulations and all pro-
visions which were included to ensure compliance with the 
oxygen content requirement. There are two rules, called the 
Direct Final Rules (DFRs),that amend the RFG regulations to 
remove the oxygen content requirement because the Energy 
Act provided for different compliances date for the removal 
of the RFG oxygen requirement in California and the rest of 
the country. These rules also revise the current prohibition 
against commingling VOC5-controlled RFG blended with 
ethanol with VOC-controlled RFG with any other type of 
oxygenate. This revision is also to prohibit combining VOC-
controlled RFG blended with ethanol with non-oxygenated 
VOC-controlled RFG except under certain limited circum-
stances. These two DFRs have become effective on April 24 
and May 5, 2006 for California and gasoline nationwide res-
pectively.
Even though there will no longer be an oxygen content 
requirement for RFG, experts suggest that many refiners will 
5 VOC stands for volatile organic compounds.
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want to continue to include oxygenate blended downstream 
in their emissions performance calculations. On the other 
hand, although blenders will not be subject to the oxygen 
standard and associated testing requirements, it is likely that 
they maintain records of their blending operation in order to 
ensure compliance with the emissions performance standards 
for the RFG.
This study is focused on the effects related to a hypotheti-
cal scenario in which one of the subsidies associated to etha-
nol production is suppressed in the fuel market. I will as-
sume that the blender’s credit has been eliminated from the 
1995/2005 period. I will also incorporate the assumption of 
product differentiation in the gasoline market. This assump-
tion could be thought of as consumers have different valua-
tions for the distinct types of gasoline in the market. When 
the more differentiated the products become, a firm has more 
incentives to behave as a monopolist. In other words, a firm 
could establish higher prices associated to less risk that large 
amount of consumers could switch their preferences towards 
other substitutes.
This paper applies a monopolistic competition model to 
calculate not only the variations of prices and market shares 
of the different liquid fuels, but also estimates the variation 
in demand for oxygenates under the hypothetical situation 
in which the blender’s credits are eliminated in the biofuel 
industry. Because the disaggregated information is not cu-
rrently available, this study uses a simulation model to simu-
late the above mentioned scenario.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the 
literature review of ethanol as a source to generate alternati-
ve fuels and a description of the recent regulations imposed 
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on refineries and blenders. Sections 3 and 4 describe the main 
assumptions needed to specify the monopolistic competition 
model used to simulate the hypothetical situation. Sections 
5, 6 and 7 correspond to the methods, procedures, data and 
conclusions considered in this study.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are few works that analyze the impact of these subsi-
dies in the biofuel industry. Taheripour and Tyner (2007) used 
analytical partial and general equilibrium models to determi-
ne the distribution of ethanol subsidies between ethanol and 
gasoline producers. They analyzed the distribution of subsidy 
benefits among the ethanol and corn producers. This study 
found, on one hand, that in a competitive market with no 
fuel standard, the ethanol and gasoline producers share the 
ethanol subsidy according to their supply elasticities and the 
elasticity of substitution between ethanol and gasoline, but on 
the other hand they sustained that ethanol producers recei-
ve most of ethanol subsidies and examined conditions under 
which these benefits can be retained in this industry. Ethanol 
producers will pass subsidy benefits to farmers when they be-
come a major corn buyer and the supply of this agricultural 
product is limited. However, farmers will pass these subsi-
dies to land owners because the supply of land is inelastic 
and limited, and therefore land owners will capture most the 
benefits from a higher price of corn which will be reflected in 
land values and land rents.
Quear and Tyner (2006) used what they called the Tiffany-
Eidman model to compare a variable rate subsidy with respect 
to the current at rate subsidy of 0.51 US$/gallon of ethanol 
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blended with gasoline. They found that the variable rate sub-
sidy would achieve a reduction in the government cost about 
37% in comparison with the current scheme and the risk as-
sumed by producers could be reduced by 21%.
Finally, Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006) studied the impact of 
trade liberalization and removal of the federal tax credit in 
United States on the international trade between the U.S. and 
Brazil. They used a multi-market international ethanol model 
calibrated on 2005 market data and policies. They found that 
the removal of trade distortions would reduce U.S. domestic 
ethanol price by 13.6% on average between 2006 and 2015 
with regard to the baseline. This price reduction will produce 
a decline of 7.2% in U.S. domestic ethanol production and 
a 3.6% increase in consumption. This study also found that 
the removal of trade barriers will increase the world ethanol 
price, the demand for ethanol, and therefore the U.S. net im-
ports as well. The authors calculated that the world ethanol 
price and U.S. imports will increase by 23.9% and 199% res-
pectively. Brazil, with its low-cost ethanol production, will 
increase its production by 9.1% on average and total Brazilian 
consumption will decrease by 3.3%, and net exports will in-
crease by 64%. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the remo-
val of trade distortions and blender’s tax credit will induce a 
16.5% increase in the world ethanol price.
In this paper, I will simulate a monopolistic competition 
model for the U.S. biofuel industry in which the blender’s 
credits are phased out in the 1995/2005 period. I will not 
analyze the impact of this removal in the international con-
text, but this simulation model will serve as a compelling tool 
to calculate the variation of market shares of the different ty-
pes of fuels in the market and the variation of the demand 
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for oxygenates under the hypothetical scenario. As another 
contribution, this paper will determine the impact of this re-
moval on the gasoline prices by distinct U.S. districts. I should 
point out that the mentioned studies have not attempted to 
calculate the gasoline price effects under the scenario related 
to the removal of the ethanol subsidy.
3. CONSUMER’S PROBLEM
The theory on differentiated products has identified two ap-
proaches in deriving discrete choice models. In the first ap-
proach, called the Non-Address Approach, the economy is 
represented by a single consumer whose preferences exhi-
bit a taste for consuming a variety of products. The second 
approach, called the Address Approach, assumes that the 
consumers have different tastes for the different brands. The 
difference between these two approaches relies on their as-
sumptions. In the first approach, the product variety is ori-
ginated from the taste of variety rather than the variety of 
consumer preferences related to the second approach. I have 
decided to implement the second approach in this study be-
cause of the absence of micro level data of the households is 
easily treated. I should emphasize that this is a structural mo-
del. In other words, consumer’s demand is generated from a 
utility maximization problem and the firms, which are assu-
med to be modeled as price-setting oligopolists, maximize 
their profits.
The U.S. liquid fuel market will be characterized by using 
a structural model which attempts to capture some of the 
main features of this market. A large market share of the to-
tal motor-fuel use in the U.S. fuel industry is destined to the 
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private and commercial use evidencing that consumers play 
an important role in the analysis of this sector. Gasoline is the 
dominant product in the U.S. fuel market. In fact, the gasoli-
ne and gasohol consumption in private and commercial use 
accounted for 74.3% of the total fuel consumption according 
to Highway Statistics (2005).
I assume that there are R=5 independent markets in the 
U.S. industry determined by the Petroleum Administration 
for Defense Districts6 (PADDs). There will be Lr firms in li-
quid fuel market r with each producing only one product. 
Even though this latter assumption could be very constrictive 
due to the multiproduct nature of the refineries and blenders’ 
production processes, it will serve as a mathematical simplifi-
cation for this oligopolistic model.
In this study, I assume that the consumers sequentially de-
cide between two options: to drive or not to drive. If the 
consumer decides to drive, then he will have a set of combus-
tible alternatives to choose from in order to fuel his car. I have 
grouped the liquid fuel products into three main categories 
corresponding to conventional (CV), reformulated (RF) and 
oxygenated (OX) gasoline.
6 The PADDs are divided into five categories. PADD I (East Coast): PADD 
IA (New England): Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont. PADD IB (Central Atlantic): Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania. PADD IC (Lower 
Atlantic): Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West 
Virginia. PADD II (Midwest): Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mi-
chigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin. PADD III (Gulf Coast): Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Texas. PADD IV (Rocky Mountain): 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming. PADD V (West Coast): Alaska 
(North Slope and Other Mainland), Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, 
Oregon, Washington.
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Thus, the consumer’s choices are described by these three 
fuel alternatives. In this paper, I have also grouped these al-
ternatives underneath two main categories which correspond 
to the option of driving a car, taking public transportation, 
biking or walking. The three latter options represent an outsi-
de good. The assumption of an outside good gives consumers 
the possibility to have an outside choice in place of the inside 
products. On the other hand, this assumption simplifies the 
mathematical analysis. Therefore, there are alternatives cate-
gorized into groups defined by g = 0,1,2,3,…,G, where g = 
0 stands for the outside choice and the remainder represents 
the consumer’s choice of driving.
I introduce a discrete choice model from which I will de-
rive a demand function associated with a well specified utility 
function as a function of the characteristics of products and 
individual taste parameters. The utility function of consumer 
i for product j in this model is given by:
                   (3.1)
Where the vectors x
j
 and p
j 
represent the observed pro-
duct characteristics and the price of the product, respectively. 
On the other hand ξij, captures the distribution of consumer 
preferences about the mean related to consumer i for pro-
duct j. The specification of the utility function of consumer i 
for product j is then written as follows:
               (3.2)
     (3.3)
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Where δj=xj β-αpj is called the mean utility level of pro-
duct j. I will assume that vi j is an identically and indepen-
dently distributed extreme value. Notice that α is interpreted 
as the disutility derived from prices and this parameter does 
not change across consumers. Moreover, ζg is common to 
all products in group g, given a consumer i. Finally, I should 
mention that the parameter σ ϵ [0,1] which is considered as 
a measure of the degree of correlation between alternatives 
belonging to the same group.
I have incorporated a nested logit framework for the con-
sumer tastes because ξij=ζig+(1-σ) vi j is also an extreme va-
lue random variable since vi j has the same distribution. Under 
this specification an individual will choose product j if the 
utility to enjoy this product exceeds the utility to be gained 
when product k was selected. That is, the choice is established 
when uij ≥ uik for j ≠ k.
In what follows, I will keep the same structure introduced 
by Berry (1994) in which the nested logit model was speci-
fied in terms of the market share functions. In that study, the 
market shares are transformed in such manner that those sha-
res depend only on the mean utility level and the correlation 
coefficient:
Sj = sj (δ,σ)
Since I have assumed an extreme value distribution, the 
market shares of product j in group g is given by:
           (3.5)
(3.1)
(3.4)
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In order to present the analytical result, I should emphasi-
ze that the mean utility level of the outside good is set equal 
to zero i.e.,δ0 = 0, . When there is an absence of the outside 
good, the consumers must choose from the inside goods and 
thus the demand will be determined only by the differences 
in prices. Therefore, the analytic expression is given by
              (3.6)
Where the market shares are defined by the following ex-
pressions sj= qj  / M, sj/g = qj/Mg for j = 0,1,…,J. On the other 
hand, M, Mg and qj represent the size of the market, the size 
of the market segment and the quantity of product j on the 
market, respectively. Once the consumer’s part has been set 
up, the own price elasticities can take the following form:
   (3.7)
4. FIRM’S PROBLEM: PRICING EQUATIONS
This section will also be based on the work done by Berry 
(1994). I have assumed in this section a set of single product 
firms each producing a differentiated product. I have also as-
sumed that the cost function is given by the following speci-
fication
Where ω
j
 is the input factor price related to product qj, 
F is a fixed cost, and γ represents the parameters associated 
to the input and quantity variables in the cost function. The 
(4.1)
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marginal cost will be denoted as cj (qj,ωj , γ) or cj omitting the 
arguments without loss of generality. In what follows, I will 
define the firm’s problem and obtain the first order necessary 
conditions in order to specify the price-margin equations for 
a single product monopolistic competition scheme:
The list of prices and quantities {p1*, p2*,…, pJ*; q1*,q2*,…, 
qJ* } is a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium if:
i) Given p1*, …, pJ*-1, pJ*+1 ,…, pJ*; pJ  solves the following 
problem:
ii) qj*=Msj* (δ,σ);p1*,p2*,…,pJ*;q1*,q2*,…,qJ* ≥ 0.
Observe from equation (4.2) that a Bertrand market 
structure has been assumed implying that the firms set prices 
rather than quantities. Bertrand structure is more convenient 
given the fact that firms are able to modify prices faster and 
at less cost than to change quantities due to the technological 
and capacity constraints related to them. The first order ne-
cessary conditions of the above problem are as follows:
Where equation (4.3) implies that the price of product 
j=1,2,…,J is equal to the marginal cost of product j plus a 
markup expression. Notice that the latter term is a function 
of the correlation coefficient, the marginal utility of income, 
(4.3)
(4.2)
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and the market shares. If σ=0,, in this case, the product sha-
res, sj, only affect the markup and conversely if σ=1, sj/g  is 
the only important factor in the markup.
One of the main contributions of this study is the calcula-
tion of the gasoline price effects when the ethanol subsidies 
are eliminated. Recall that I have clasiffied the gasoline mar-
ket products into three categories. Two of them are blended 
with ethanol such as the reformulated and the oxygenated 
gasolines while the conventional gasoline is not blended with 
any type of oxygenates. Equation (4.3) can be written in or-
der to be product specific as follows:
Where ωe,ωj-1 represents the ethanol price and other in-
put prices utilized in the production process to obtain the re-
formulated and oxygenated gasolines. Equation for the con-
ventional gasoline is given by:
The second term of equation (4.4) can be expressed as pj / κj 
and therefore:
If the cost function is twice continuously differentiable, 
then C* satisfies:
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
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Where the last equality holds by introducing the Shephard’s 
Lemma and thus xe represents the input demand for ethanol. 
I then take the derivative of equation (4.6) with respect to 
subsidy, s, and thus:
Since the own price elasticity, kj , is a function of the σ,sj/g 
and sj, the intuition provided by equation (4.8) could be 
analyzed in three cases which are described below. As I have 
mentioned previously σ is defined as the degree of intragroup 
correlation. In other words, as σ→0 the within group co-
rrelation of utility goes to one and as σ→0 the correlation 
between products belonging to the same group goes to zero. 
Recall that this relationship is established in terms of product 
characteristics. Therefore, if consumers think that two pro-
ducts in the same group have the same characteristics, these 
products will be highly correlated, and thus, this could be 
thought of as if consumers are not able to distinguish the di-
fference between a product environmentally improved such 
as either the reformulated or oxygenated gasoline and non-
quality improved product such as the conventional gasoline.
(4.7)
(4.8)
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Case I: If σ→1, sj/g > 0 and sj > 0, then kj → - ∞. The-
refore, the price effects related to the blended products are 
given by:
When the blended product demand curves are perfectly 
elastic, the variation of the blends prices with regard to sub-
sidy changes will depend on ∂xeqj
 and ∂xe
∂j
which are positive and 
negative respectively. The first term implies that an increase 
in the production of either the reformulated or the oxygena-
ted gasoline will produce a positive impact on the demand 
for ethanol. On the other hand, the second term of equation 
(4.9) establishes a negative relationship between the subsidy 
and the ethanol price. Therefore, this theoretical framework 
suggests that the subsidy will be negatively related to the 
blends prices, in other words, a decrease in the ethanol subsi-
dies will produce an increase in the prices associated with the 
blended products.
Case II: If σ→0, sj/g > 0 and sj > 0, then kj → α pj (sj -1 ). 
then. Therefore, the price effects are given by:
In this case, the price effects will depend on the market shares 
of the products blended with ethanol at the nationwide.
Case III: If σ ϵ (0,1), sj/g > 0 and sj > 0, then the price 
effects are determined by equation (4.8). Equations (4.8) and 
(4.10) would suggest a negative relationship between prices 
(4.9)
(4.10)
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and subsidies if the first part of the equation, which is negati-
ve, dominates the second term.
On the other hand, I take the derivative of equation (4.5) 
with respect to subsidies in order to obtain the effect on con-
ventional gasoline prices under the hypothetical scenario. I 
get the following expression:
Equation (4.11) might reflect a negative relation between 
conventional gasoline price and subsidies since the derivatives 
of the market shares with respect to subsidies are also nega-
tive. A decrease in the ethanol subsidies might produce a re-
duction of the market shares associated with the blended pro-
ducts and therefore this might imply an increase in either the 
conventional gasoline market share or the outside alternative 
providing the intuition related to the sign of these derivatives.
Similarly, equation (4.11) could be analyzed into three cases:
Case I: If σ→1, scv/g > 0 and scv > 0, then kcv→ - ∞., and 
then. Therefore, the magnitude of the price effects related to 
the conventional gasoline tends to be negligible because the 
demand for this gasoline is perfectly elastic. For instance, a 
decrease in the ethanol subsidies will produce a reduction 
of the blended products market shares, and therefore, the 
fuel market will experience an increase in the market sha-
re associated with the conventional gasoline. Consequently, 
the increase of the conventional gasoline market share might 
(4.11)
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pressure its prices to be higher, but since the demand for this 
type of gasoline tends to be perfectly elastic, in this case, the 
magnitude of the price effects might be negligibly small.
Case II: If σ→0, scv/g > 0 and scv > 0, then kcv→ α pcv (scv- 
1). Therefore, the price effects are given by:
In this case, the price effects will depend exclusively on the 
market shares of the conventional gasoline at the nationwide.
Case III: If σ ϵ (0,1), scv/g > 0 and, then the price effects 
are determined by equation (4.11) which indicates a negative 
relationship between conventional gasoline price and ethanol 
subsidies since ∂scv/g
∂s
 < 0 and 
∂scv
∂s
 < 0.
Source: Departament of Energy
Figure 5.1
Petroleum Administration for Defense District.
(4.12)
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5. DATA
I have gathered information on the prices and sales of the 
different liquid fuel categories that were previously defined. 
Moreover, I have collected information on the weight and vo-
lume percentages of the distinct types of additives used in 
the production of gasoline programs such as the reformula-
ted gasoline. The former data was collected from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) data base while the latter 
information was obtained from the reports elaborated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I worked with all 
this information by the Petroleum Administration for Defen-
se Districts (PADDs), which are depicted in the figure (5.1), 
for 1995/2005 period.
Table 5.1
Average market shares for 94-05 period (in percentage)1
PADD 1 2 3 4 5
Total Market 
Shares
Marginal Costs 
(Cents per gallon)
CV
21
(0.019)
25
(0.059)
8
(0.030)
3
(0.010)
5
(0.020)
62
(0.089)
75.5
OX
2
(0.004)
0.3
(0.002)
1
(0.003)
2
(0.016)
5
(0.015)
N.A.2
RF
8
(0.029)
5
(0.017)
6
(0.017)
14
(0.049)
33
(0.103) 76.5
1 Standart deviations are in parenthesis
2 No avaliable
 Source: Elaboración cálculos propios
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Figure 5.2
Market shares at Nationwide
Source: US Departament of energy
Table 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics about the 
data base utilized in this study. In 1994/2005 period, conven-
tional gasoline accounts on average for 62% of the gasoline 
market while the oxygenated and reformulated gasoline are 
about 4.96% and a 33.04%, respectively. Table 5.1 also pro-
vides information on how the consumption related to these 
three products is split among the 5 regions in the country. In 
fact, two of the most important regions in terms of consump-
tion of conventional gasoline are the East coast and the Mid-
west accounting for the 21 and 25 per cent on average whi-
le the West coast registers the most important participation 
with regard to the consumption of the reformulated gasoline. 
The information obtained from the Department of Energy 
is in terms of thousands gallons a day by year and by districts. 
Figure (5.2) describes the evolution of the market shares re-
lated to these three types of gasoline considered in this study 
at the nationwide. It is worth noting that the market shares 
of the conventional gasoline has been declining since the in-
troduction of the oxygenated and reformulated programs in 
1994. The latter product has been gaining market share since 
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then. The reformulated gasoline has been growing on avera-
ge at the rate of 11.74% while the conventional gasoline has 
been decreasing at 4.48% on average in this period.
Source: US Departament of Energy
Figure 5.3
Petroleum refineries
Figure (5.3) Depicts the concentration of the refineries 
across the country. Most of the refineries are located on the 
West and Gulf coasts, primarily because of access to major 
sea transportation and shipping routes.
On the other hand, I estimated a short-run multiproduct 
symmetric generalized Leontief cost function to approximate 
the refineries and blenders’ technology. I assumed that this 
flexible functional form reflects the fact that refineries and 
blenders used some inputs: crude oil, natural gas and some 
oxygenates such as ethanol and MTBE, to produce aggregate 
outputs such as the reformulated gasoline, the conventional 
gasoline and others. I also included the fixed asset and ener-
gy inputs in our cost function specification. These variables 
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represent our quasi-fixed inputs. Therefore, I have employed 
those estimated marginal costs as starting points to accom-
plish our simulation, otherwise the model would not have 
been calibrated precisely.
Finally, the Reformulated Gasoline (RFG) Surveys Oxyge-
nate Information served to calculate the demand for different 
oxygenates whose methodology is explained later on in this 
work. Table 5.2 contains the average oxygenate concentration 
in terms of volume percent by districts for the period under 
analysis. Note that this information reflects the impacts of the 
ban related to the MTBE on the demand for oxygenates. A 
year later the ban of MTBE entered in effect, the demand for 
ethanol rose substantially while the MTBE experienced a con-
sistent reduction at the nationwide.
Table 5.2
Calculated average oxygenate (RFG)
(volume percent)
Year MTBE ETBE TAME Ethanol
PADD1
1995 10.46 0.05 0.85 0.06
1996 9.96 0.03 0.76 0.04
1997 10.65 0.00 0.67 0.07
1998 10.30 0.00 0.64 0.05
1999 17.32 7.26 1.60 0.14
2000 8.75 0.00 0.89 0.08
2001 9.60 0.00 1.07 0.05
2002 10.10 0.01 0.95 0.07
2003 9.67 0.01 0.76 0.30
2004 8.96 0.00 0.31 1.96
2005 8.26 0.01 0.31 2.03
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PADD2
1995 3.44 1.05 0.07 4.39
1996 3.39 0.02 0.05 5.75
1997 3.41 0.00 0.00 6.05
1998 3.14 0.00 0.00 6.58
1999 3.11 0.00 0.04 6.85
2000 3.07 0.00 0.04 6.67
2001 2.18 0.00 0.01 7.99
2002 1.69 0.00 0.01 8.48
2003 0.01 0.00 0.00 10.37
2004 0.01 0.00 0.00 10.41
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.51
PADD3
1995 9.72 0.46 0.91 0.01
1996 8.74 0.02 1.34 0.00
1997 9.56 0.00 1.09 0.00
1998 9.93 0.00 1.16 0.02
1999 10.03 0.00 0.89 0.00
2000 10.34 0.00 0.88 0.00
2001 10.22 0.00 1.17 0.00
2002 10.41 0.00 0.91 0.00
2003 10.85 0.00 0.84 0.00
2004 10.51 0.00 0.98 0.00
2005 10.22 0.00 0.98 0.00
PADD5
1996 10.89 0.00 0.29 0.00
1997 9.63 0.03 0.35 0.95
1998 11.16 0.03 0.22 0.00
1999 11.64 0.00 0.21 0.00
2000 11.46 0.00 0.26 0.00
2001 10.16 0.00 0.25 0.66
2002 9.96 0.00 0.19 0.71
2003 2.16 0.00 0.06 4.70
2004 0.00 0.00 0.06 5.91
2005 0.00 0.00 0.02 5.98
Source: Elaboración cálculos propios
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6. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The main justification for the application of this methodology 
is the lack of the household’s information that would have 
served to estimate the equilibrium parameters and condi-
tions. However, this method could become a very appealing 
procedure that policy makers could utilize in order to cap-
ture the economic effect to suppress the subsidies in the U.S. 
biofuel market.
This methodology is based on the study done by Ivaldi and 
Vibes (2005). The authors created this algorithm to simulate 
many scenarios in the German passenger rail and air trans-
port industries. They simulated some potential scenarios such 
as the entry of a Low Cost Airline (LCAs), the entry of a low 
cost train and the presence of a new kerosene tax in this mar-
ket. The deregulation in these industries along with the deve-
lopment of high speed technology that has reduced the gap 
between air and train travel time and the presence of low cost 
airlines which offer affordable tickets to an important market 
share of the population have boosted the competition bet-
ween rail and air transportation. Therefore, passengers can 
decide between several modes and even several companies or 
alternatives between modes to obtain the transport service. 
These authors present a simulation model to analyze not only 
the inter modal competition, but also the competition within 
the same type of transportation. Regulatory changes on a 
particular framework incorporating the problems originated 
from the lack of disaggregated information.
The simulation of the hypothetical situation associated 
with the entry of Low Cost Airlines resulted in decreases of 
the market shares of rail, car, incumbent airline and the out-
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side alternatives; but the LCAs market share increased. Prices 
related to all modes of transportation experienced reductions 
with a biggest impact on the LCAs price. The authors obtained 
the same pattern under the different assumptions of the out-
side alternative market shares established in 20%, 35% and 
65%. On the other hand, the entry of a Low Cost Train (LCT) 
corresponds to a structural change in the market with very 
important consequences in the leisure segment. Prices decli-
ned for all alternatives, and the prices of the leisure segment 
of this transport mode declined by more than 20%. All trans-
port mode market shares dropped favoring the participation 
of the new entrant, but it is worth mentioning that the busi-
ness segment was less responsive since consumers in this seg-
ment do not appreciate land transport. The incumbent train 
company was not displaced by the new entrant due to the 
presence of imprecise information on the price differential 
and some other external considerations for the consumers. 
Finally, the authors evaluated the effect of a new kerosene tax 
manifested in an increase in airlines costs. The introduction 
of this new tax increased airline prices about 10% and all the 
other transportation modes experienced increases in smaller 
magnitudes. The increases in the tariffs produced that airli-
nes released some traffic which was partly absorbed for other 
modes and even for the outside alternative.
This model has served to evaluate the effects of both struc-
tural and regulatory changes on a particular framework in-
corporating the problems originated from the lack of disag-
gregated information.
For the calibration of this model, I will need to compute 
demand elasticities, marginal costs and demand parameters 
as well. The equilibrium solutions are obtained by using the 
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system of equations (3.6), (3.7) and (4.4). This model is sol-
ved in several steps: i) First, the demand parameters and are 
calculated by using the equation (3.7). I generate a random 
vector of elasticities establishing coherent assumptions on 
their distributions. In order to make consistent assumptions 
with regard to the vector of elasticities, I have used the esti-
mated elasticities and their standard deviations recovered in 
the survey done by Dahl and Sterner (1991). This paper is a 
collection of studies on the U.S. gasoline demand elasticities. 
This survey classified the studies by data type and by different 
categories of model, the authors found a fair degree of agree-
ment with regard to average short-run and long-run income 
and price elasticities7. The vector of elasticities is assumed to 
be normally distributed with one thousand repetitions. The 
demand parameters and are found by minimizing the avera-
ge difference between the random vectors of elasticities and 
their associated expression proposed by Ivaldi and Vibes:
2) Second, I compute the marginal costs using the system of 
equations (4.3). I repeat this procedure until the vector of di-
ferences between the computed and observed marginal costs 
were negligibly small. By following these steps, I was able to 
save the latest values for α , σ, marginal costs and the vector 
of own prices elasticities by districts.
7 Dahl and Sterner (1991) did not consider estimation on seasonal data 
and some inappropriate model formulations.
(6.1)
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Finally, the market share of the outside good8 has been as-
sumed to take the values of 3% and 5%. In other words, the 
percentage of consumers who do not consume gasoline could 
amount for those values restricting the gasoline market size 
assumption.
7. SIMULATION RESULTS ON THE U.S. FUEL MARKET
This simulation consists in capturing the economic effects of 
eliminating the subsidies associated to the biofuel production 
in 1995-2005 period. Ethanol production has been motivated 
among other incentives for the subsidies. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to question to what extent this biofuel has been 
able to compete on its own merits. Certainly, an absence of 
ethanol subsidies will have an impact on the marginal costs 
associated to the blended products such as the oxygenated 
and reformulated gasoline. I have calculated that an average 
increase of 10% in the marginal costs of these products have 
been translated in three effects: i) a decrease in the market 
shares associated with the ethanol-gasoline products, ii) price 
increases of ethanol blended products, and iii) a reduction of 
the demand for oxygenates due to the decrease of reformula-
ted gasoline market shares.
The following results coincide with the intuition provided 
by the economic theory on single-product monopolist com-
petition. As I can observe in the figure (7.1), when I assume 
that the subsidies, S, are suppressed, the marginal cost curve 
will shift up and therefore a new equilibrium is reached.
8 According to the Bureau of Transportation through the OmniStats in 
2003 reported that 95% of individuals on one typical day last month either 
drive or ride in a personal vehicle, company car, carpool, vanpool while the 
remainder took public transportation, biked or walked to get to work.
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This new equilibrium is denoted by pw and qw, terms 
that represent the prices and quantities without subsidies. It 
should be noted that the new equilibrium establishes an in-
crease in prices and a decrease in quantities under the situa-
tion in which the blender’s credits are eliminated.
Recall that there are two blended products, reformulated 
gasoline and oxy-fuels, which are currently enjoying the sub-
sidy benefits and thus, these products will experience decrea-
ses of their market shares under the hypothetical situation. 
Notice that the diminution of the reformulated gasoline’s 
market share implies a decline of the required amount of 
oxygenates used in the blending processes.
Prices (p)
p
w
p
s
q
s
q
w
MC
MC-S
D(P)
MR
Quantities (q)
Figure 7.1
A single-product monopolist
The simulated results confirmed this economic intuition 
and are reported in the following tables.
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Table 7.1
Average variation on market shares assuming outside good share: 
3% and prices for 1995/2005 period. (In percentage)
Market 
Share1
PADDs
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5
CV
12.91
(6.50)
17.86
(6.66)
19.32
(12.95)
14.42
(11.46)
15.47
(21.89)
OX
-35.27
(22.23)
-49.29
(25.43)
-37.68
(24.60)
-24.48
(24.48)
RF
-39.12
(25.85) 
-32.29
(14.30)
-26.76
(15.65)
-18.67
(10.35)
Prices
CV
0.66
(0.29)
1.34
(0.81)
0.57
(0.46)
0.24
(0.32)
0.47
(0.53)
OX
11.62
(1.07)
11.62
(1.22)
7.64
(0.92)
8.57
(1.19)
RF
9.78
(0.39)
9.19
(0.96)
8.16
(1.14)
6.50
(0.76)
1 The variation of the outside alternative averaged 4% in this period.
Table 7.2
Average variation on market shares assuming outside good share: 
5% and prices for 1995/2005 period. (In percentage)
Market Share1 PADDs
Alternatives 1 2 3 4 5
CV
11.43
(9.08)
13.03
(4.16)
20.60
(11.25)
12.25
(6.73)
27.46
(26.77)
OX
-40.72
(22.23)
-39.40
(20.37)
-25.09
(20.60)
-37.41
(22.77)
RF
-38.81
(21.16) 
-35.77
(16.87)
-27.51
(18.05)
-19.91
(10.85)
Continúa...
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Market Share1 PADDs
Prices 1 2 3 4 5
CV
1.27
(2.06)
1.12
(0.59)
0.58
(0.38)
0.12
(0.08)
0.44
(0.57)
OX
11.62
(1.07)
11.53
(1.00)
7.59
(0.93)
8.65
(1.13)
RF
9.12
(2.14)
9.12
(0.94)
8.12
(1.16)
6.49
(0.84)
1 The variation of the outside alternative averaged 6% in this period.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 contain information on the percenta-
ge changes of market shares and prices under the hypothe-
tical scenario where the blender’s credits are phased out for 
1995/2005 period. I assume that the outside good’s market 
share is either 3% or 5%. Notice that the elimination of etha-
nol production subsidies, manifested as an increase in margi-
nal costs, have decreased the market shares of both the refor-
mulated and oxygenated gasoline on average. These decreases 
are in a range between 18.67 and 49.29 per cent. Conversely, 
the conventional gasoline market shares have experienced in-
crements in all the regions. With absence of subsidies, consu-
mers were not only willing to switch their consumption de-
cision from the ethanol blends to the regular gasoline across 
petroleum districts, but they would also have been willing to 
take public transportation, bike or walk more frequently. The 
latter conjecture is sustained by the average increase associa-
ted to the outside alternative market share which is about 4% 
and 6% respectively.
It is worth mentioning that one of the relevant contribu-
tions of this paper has been the approximation of the gasoline 
price variations related to the relaxation of subsidies in the 
U.S. biofuel industry. Notice that all the PADDs have experien-
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ced price increases. These increases are also in terms of ave-
rage for 1995-2005 period. As I observe from those tables, 
conventional gasoline has captured some impact on its prices 
which are in a range between 0.12 and 1.34 per cent. On the 
other hand, among the ethanol blends, the oxygenated gaso-
line has experienced a greater increase than that observed in 
the reformulated gasoline prices for the period of analysis.
8. SIMULATION RESULTS ON THE U.S. OXYGENATE MARKET
In order to calculate the demand for oxygenates under the 
hypothetical situation in which the ethanol’s subsidies are re-
laxed, I have assumed that there is only two oxygenate types 
in the U.S. market such as ethanol and MTBE. Either of these 
two oxygenates could be used to produce the reformulated 
gasoline. I have also assumed that the blenders are associa-
ted with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
function9. The CES production function takes the following 
form:
Where Cv, E, and M represents the amounts of conventio-
nal gasoline, ethanol and methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) 
utilized to produce the reformulated gasoline, Rf. The degree 
of homogeneity of the function has been denoted by r,τ > 0 
represents the efficiency parameter which is commonly as-
sociated with the size of the production function. Moreover, 
9 The CES production functions were introduced by Arrow, Chenery, 
Minhas and Solow (1961).
(8.1)
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θ,βϵ [0,1] denote relative factor shares and finally ρ repre-
sents the substitution parameter used to derive the elasticity 
of substitution.
Therefore, the blender’s problem consist on finding 
the list of inputs {Cv*, E*,M* }, given the list of prices 
{Pcv*,PE*,PM* }; such that {Cv , E, M}solve the following 
maximization problem:
Subject to equation (8.1) and the non-negativity constra-
int. Assuming interior solutions and replacing the production 
function in the equation (8.2), the first order necessary con-
ditions of the above problem are as follows:
It is worth noticing that the assumptions of constant re-
turns to scale, i.e. r = 1, the normalization of the conventional 
gasoline price and the presence of ethanol subsidies, S, have 
been introduced in the maximization problem. Re-arranging 
the above system of equations, I found the following expres-
sions:
(8.2)
(8.3)
(8.4)
(8.5)
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The main goal of this part of the analysis is to obtain the 
ratios under both scenarios, with and without ethanol’s subsi-
dies, in order to identify some substitution patterns between 
ethanol, MTBE and the conventional gasoline; but the parame-
ter is unknown. Therefore, I simulated the above system of 
equations by creating a grid of values for rho. This simulation 
was possible since I have information on prices and on the 
oxygen requirements imposed by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) in terms of weight percent described in 
Table 5.2.
Figure 8.1
Ethanol-MTBE ratios
(8.6)
(8.7)
(8.8)
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The simulation proceeded by executing the following 
steps: i) p was assumed to be either uniformly or normally 
distributed, ii) the random numbers of ρ served to generated 
the different input ratios taking into account the hypothetical 
situations, iii) the computed input ratios were compared with 
the actual data, and iv) this loop ended when the difference 
calculated in iii) was negligible obtaining the most appealing 
value for the parameter ρ under this criterion. The maximum 
level of tolerance for the difference between input ratios was 
established in twenty percent. The results are depicted in the 
following graphics:
Figure (8.1) indicates that the elimination of the ethanol’s 
subsidies would have induced the blenders to substitute ethanol 
for another oxygenate type, in this case MTBE, to satisfy the EPA 
regulations. The darker points represent the situation in which 
the subsidies have been suppressed and those points are rela-
ted to lower ethanol-MTBE ratios compared with the scenario 
in which subsidies are included. As a result of this substitution 
pattern between ethanol and MTBE, the conventional gasoline-
ethanol ratio increases under the elimination of the ethanol’s 
subsidies. The latest is illustrated in Figure (8.2). Obviously, 
the higher the elasticity of substitution, the lower the ethanol-
MTBE ratios, this is described in Figure (8.3).
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Figure 8.2. Cv-Ethanol ratios
Figure 8.3
Ethanol-MTBE ratios (w/o) vs. η
According to these simulation results, the suppression of 
the ethanol’s subsidies would have reduced the ethanol-MT-
BE ratio in 55:14% on average with a standard deviation of 
0.123, while the elasticity of substitution averaged 1.38 with 
a standard deviation of 0.1766. The details of these results are 
reported in the Appendix.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Ivaldi-Vibes algorithm has proven to give very appea-
ling results in its economic applications. I believe that this 
algorithm has also provided reasonable results with regard 
to the simulation associated with a hypothetical elimination 
on ethanol production subsidies. I have reported that, under 
this hypothetical scenario, the individuals were not only wi-
lling to switch their consumption decision, but they were also 
willing to consider alternative modes of transportation such 
as the public transportation, bike or walk. In other words, 
the outside alternative market share increased about 4% and 
6%; and the conventional gasoline market shares increased 
as well, while the others related to the ethanol blends expe-
rienced decreases across all petroleum districts. I have also 
simulated the impact on the gasoline prices. At the best of 
my knowledge, there is no a study which has tried to capture 
the impact on the gasoline price under the elimination of the 
ethanol subsidies. It should be noticed that the conventional 
gasoline prices have increased in a range between 0.12 and 
1.34 percent.
I could conclude many lessons from this study: i) this al-
gorithm allowed the simulation of the market shares for the 
distinct types of gasoline under the hypothetical scenario. The 
oxygenated gasolines experienced decreases in their market 
shares and therefore those looses were manifested in increa-
ses of the conventional gasoline and the outside alternative 
market shares, ii) As results of looses in the market shares 
and increases in prices of the oxygenated gasolines, firms 
producing conventional gasoline could gain more profit by 
exercising its monopoly power and establishing higher prices 
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in the range mentioned before. Therefore, this methodology 
could be considered a complementary tool for the competi-
tion analysis in this industry, iii) since there is no households 
data that allows the application of more precise econometric 
methods, this framework permits to model some features of 
the gasoline market and to analyze some changes in the tax-
subsidy scheme.
This algorithm could be extended to introduce the analy-
sis of other industry policies such as the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dards and to measure its impacts on the gasoline and oxyge-
nate markets.
On the other hand, as it is well known, different types of 
oxygenates are blended with the regular gasoline satisfying 
the EPA regulations. Therefore, the reduction in the reformu-
lated gasoline market shares implied a trade off in the demand 
for these oxygenates whose variation rates were reported in 
Table A.6. It should be pointed out that the elimination of 
ethanol’s subsidies has shown a substitution pattern between 
ethanol and MTBE. Under this scenario blenders are induced 
to replace the most expensive ethanol alternative for another 
type of oxygenate, in this case MTBE. Evidently, the ethanol-
MTBE ratio decreased and this reduction averaged 55:14% 
with a standard deviation of 0.123. The measure of goodness 
of fit associated to this simulation model is about 48.78%.
This method could serve as a basic tool for both firms and 
regulators viewpoints. Even though, I certainly believe that 
many assumptions could be relaxed. One of the assumptions 
that has been eliminated in this paper is related to the margi-
nal costs. The marginal cost was not assumed to be constant; 
in fact, these marginal costs were calculated in the first chap-
ter of this dissertation by using a flexible functional form cost 
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function. On the other hand, possible extensions that I might 
intend to address are the hypothetical situation in which a 
finite number of potential plants decide to enter in the gasoli-
ne production market and the introduction of the Renewable 
Fuel Standard objectives. Finally, other extensions could be 
associated to the assumptions of market structure competi-
tion and prices.
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